INTEREST JOURNAL DRUPAL & WEB

Auditing Drupal 11.4.11 and PHP 8.4.27: Part 1

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Why I wrote and published this series

I would like to begin with the background to this series and why I chose to publish it.

With the rapid rise of AI, attacks are becoming increasingly automated and aggressive. Here in Japan, reports of corporate data breaches and personal devices being hijacked for use as botnet relays have become a familiar part of the news. For me, this is an immediate concern.

From my perspective, a major bottleneck is the gap between technical knowledge and the decisions needed to act on it. Developers may understand the urgency, while non-technical decision-makers and site owners struggle to understand what a warning means for their own site. Critical security updates can then be delayed, sometimes because of the fear that an update might break something.

Small business owners, clients, and beginners do not necessarily share the technical background that developers work with every day. If an update fails because of differences between environments, that experience can make them reluctant to try again. Keeping a system unchanged may feel safer, even as threats continue to evolve.

My goal is to help bridge that gap with accessible, hands-on information. I want people who are not developers to understand what their Drupal setup is doing, build confidence through local checks, and take practical steps before their production environment is compromised. I hope this series can provide common ground where business owners and developers can talk to each other about the same issues.

I have immense respect for Drupal’s structured architecture. It gives me the same sense of awe I felt when I first encountered FreeBSD 3.x years ago. Because I want to see this system continue to evolve and be used safely, I believe its engineering should be supported by end-user awareness and practical workflows for protecting their own environments.

With that motivation, I began by inspecting the Drupal environment I use myself.

When I keep writing articles and building a site with Drupal, the list of things to check grows with each update. Alongside core and module versions, there are unused features, dependencies inherited from an earlier theme, and settings left over from local development.

This audit was prompted by the recently disclosed PHP2Shell issues, CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619. I had been updating PHP and Drupal, but I also wanted to understand how my particular environment and settings affected exposure and the precautions needed in everyday use. I therefore inspected my article-production Drupal environment, running in DDEV on a MacBook. These two vulnerabilities are in PHP itself; updating Drupal alone does not replace the PHP fixes. PHP’s official security announcement

I also tested the Drupal 12 beta in a separate DDEV environment ahead of the planned stable release in the week of December 7, 2026 (UTC). This series records both the inspection of my current Drupal 11 setup and the Drupal 12 testing I carried out with the next major version in mind. Drupal’s official release schedule ↗

I used Codex during the work, checking command output and actual page rendering as I went. This audit inspected the environment and its settings; it did not reproduce PHP2Shell attacks or experimentally establish whether they could succeed.

The starting point was Drupal 11.4.11 and PHP 8.4.27 as installed on November 1, 2026. The first three parts cover inspecting the current setup, adjusting settings, switching to an independent theme, and checking the results. The following article covers the Drupal 12 beta in a separate environment.

This first part records the state before those changes. Some findings were addressed afterward, but I will first explain what the initial checks established and what still needed investigation.

Why inspect a local Drupal environment?

In my workflow, Drupal is also a production environment for articles, classifications, and multilingual content. The public site currently serves static files generated by Hugo: Drupal and PHP do not run where readers access the site. The Drupal installation inspected here is a local environment for trying out content, classification, and presentation.

Local environments have settings that make development easier. Being able to write files and display detailed errors is useful, but the same settings are not necessarily suitable for a publicly accessible environment.

Static publishing removes the need to run certain features on the public server. Editing articles, saving files, and managing settings still happen in the Drupal production environment, however. Making the public site static does not eliminate the need to inspect the environment used to produce it.

My aim was to understand how the local setup behaved and establish a basis for continuing to use it. I limited the checks to my own DDEV environment and examined package composition, Drupal warnings, and access through the web separately.

Check the versions actually running

Item Environment checked
DDEV 1.25.5
Drupal 11.4.11
PHP CLI / FPM 8.4.27
MariaDB 10.11.19
Web server Nginx
Drush 13.8.0

DDEV runs development services such as PHP, a database, and a web server in containers. This table describes what was actually running in the DDEV project, rather than the configuration of the MacBook as a whole.

PHP CLI is the PHP used to execute commands in a terminal. FPM processes requests passed to it by the web server. I checked both so that I would not confuse the conditions under which Composer and Drush ran with those used when opening a page in a browser.

I also checked that the terminal and web processes used the same PHP version. In the past, differences between server-side and command-line PHP had caused difficulties when running Composer and Drush.

Drush provides command-line tools for inspecting and administering Drupal. Here I used it to check that Drupal bootstrapped successfully, which versions were running, and what warnings were reported.

Recording the actual versions makes it possible to interpret the results later. These are the conditions used on the test date, not a list of recommended versions or the latest releases at the time of publication.

Audit the dependency packages

Drupal runs with more than its core packages. I also checked Composer-managed libraries and dependencies brought in by contributed modules.

Composer manages PHP libraries and their dependencies. It tracks the packages and version constraints a project requires, and records the selected versions in composer.lock. I used that information to inspect the libraries supporting Drupal as well as Drupal itself. Composer’s basic usage documentation

These were the main commands used. I ran Composer inside the container from the target DDEV project’s directory.

ddev exec composer audit --locked --format=json
ddev exec composer audit --format=json
ddev exec composer check-platform-reqs
ddev exec composer outdated --direct
Command What I checked
audit --locked Whether packages recorded in the lock file matched the advisories being checked
audit Whether the installed packages matched those advisories
check-platform-reqs Whether PHP and its extensions met the installed packages’ requirements
outdated --direct Whether update candidates existed for directly required packages

Looking separately at the lock file and the installed packages helps distinguish the intended configuration from what is actually present. Before interpreting the audit, I compared their package names and versions.

I audited both configurations. All 100 package names and versions matched, and the advisory checks found no known vulnerability matches or abandoned packages.

An abandoned notice can indicate that a package is no longer maintained. It does not mean the same thing as a vulnerability advisory, but it matters when deciding which packages to keep using.

Likewise, an available update does not necessarily mean that the installed version has a known vulnerability. I treated outdated as a check for update candidates and audit as a comparison against published information.

A clean audit means that the checked packages did not match the information available to that audit at that time. It does not establish the safety of all custom code, JavaScript outside Composer’s management, operating-system packages, or site-specific settings. Composer’s audit documentation

The next checks did, in fact, identify issues outside the package audit.

Read administration warnings individually

Drupal’s status report showed the following warnings.

Warning How I approached it
Configuration file protection disabled Check actual write permissions and the state after restarting DDEV
Contact and History deprecated Check current usage and dependencies
Stable 9 deprecated Trace the parent-theme dependencies of the active theme
HTML5 validation setting Understand the change and test form behavior
Module and theme updates Distinguish available updates from known vulnerability matches

Deprecation is a notice to consider future use and migration. By itself, it does not show that an attack is occurring in the current environment. I first checked whether each feature was in use and whether another feature depended on it.

Stable 9 was one example. Further inspection showed that my active custom subtheme depended on it through Bootstrap5. I used this as an opportunity to reconsider that dependency and switch to an independent theme. Part 3 describes the process.

Warnings have different meanings. Some concern future compatibility; others describe settings intentionally used for development. Before trying to remove a warning, I wanted to understand why it appeared.

Check what HTTP requests can retrieve

Alongside administration screens and file permissions, I checked what could be retrieved without logging in.

An HTTP check observes how the web server responds through the same entry point a browser uses to request pages and files. Here I sent GET requests without login credentials to existing paths in my own local environment.

Administration pages and update scripts denied access. One existing YAML file in the configuration synchronization directory, however, was retrievable anonymously. The directory listing was blocked, but requesting the file directly returned it.

Configuration synchronization YAML files contain exported Drupal configuration. They serve a different purpose from published article data, so whether they need to be readable over the web deserves examination.

I distinguished between listing a directory and reading an individual file whose name is known. Denying the first does not necessarily deny the second. In this case, the directory-listing request returned 403, while the request for the checked file returned 200.

Rather than relying on the 200 response alone, I compared the retrieved content’s SHA-256 hash with the existing local file and confirmed a match. This established that I had actually retrieved the file, rather than receiving an error page with a 200 status.

The finding covers one existing file. It does not establish that every file in that directory was retrievable or that credentials had leaked. The next article covers the response and the checks after changing the file location.

This result showed why both the administration screen and actual HTTP responses matter. Checking file types and locations revealed something that version checks alone had missed.

What these checks do not establish

The checks targeted my own local environment. They do not show that the public site was in the same state or that a third party obtained information.

They also did not comprehensively test fine-grained access control across multiple authenticated roles, every external library, the entire operating system, or whether a compromise had occurred. When recording results, I make the tested scope explicit.

What the inspection showed

The Composer-managed packages had no known vulnerability matches in the audit, and PHP and its extensions met the checked requirements. The administration warnings and configuration-file placement still needed attention.

Checking versions, comparing dependencies, understanding warnings, and observing real HTTP responses examine different aspects of the environment. I found it useful to combine those checks rather than rely on a single result.

The next article covers updates, removing unused features, the HTML5 validation setting, reviewing access to YAML files, and repeating the checks afterward.

Follow-up: official-source comparison (November 4, 2026)

These notes were added after reviewing official sources on November 4. They are separate from the November 1–2 measurements; no Drupal environment was changed or retested.

Support dates and the scope of the measurements

The official-source review adds a maintenance-planning consideration. PSA-2026-11-02 ↗ reduces overlapping minor-version security coverage to eight months for versions supported in 2027 and lists April 2027 for Drupal 11.4. Earlier release-note dates alone should not determine the plan.

The 100-package comparison and HTTP responses remain November 1 measurements. This follow-up compares documentation; it does not report a fresh Composer audit or HTTP test. Future checks should also consult the chapter 13 update annotations and advisories matching the actual core and extensions.

Drupal 11 & 12 checks and samples ↗